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Abstract:
Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen so-
cial welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of util-
ity function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the
Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (1980) claimed
that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way represen-
tation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on
the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors — that is, an increase
in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social
strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insuffi-
cient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and
its sufficiency demonstrated.
JEL Classification: D71
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1 Introduction: Roberts’ Claim
Consider a society with a non-empty finite set N of individuals i.1 Let X
be a domain of at least three social states, and R(X) the set of all logically
possible (complete and transitive) social weak preference orderings R on X.
For each R ∈ R(X), let P and I denote the corresponding strict preference
and indifference relations.
Let RN denote the Euclidean space that consists of the Cartesian product
of #N copies of the real line R. A utility function profile uN is a mapping
X 3 x 7→ uN (x) ∈ RN . Let UN denote the set of all utility function profiles
on X. Following Sen (1970, 1977), a social welfare functional (or SWFL)
f on a domain D ⊆ UN is a mapping D 3 uN 7→ f(uN ) ∈ R(X) that
determines a social preference ordering R = f(uN ) for each utility function
profile in D. With some slight abuse of notation, we let R(uN ), P (uN )
and I(uN ) denote respectively the weak preference, strict preference, and
indifference relations associated with f(uN ).
Given any non-empty subset A ⊂ X:
1. say that two utility function profiles uN , u˜N ∈ UN are equal on A just
in case one has uN (x) = u˜N (x) for all x ∈ A;
2. say that two social preference orderings R and R˜ on X are equal on A
just in case for all y, z ∈ A one has y R z ⇐⇒ y R˜ z.
This paper considers social welfare functionals f satisfying at least the
first two of the following three axioms:
Unrestricted domain (U) The domain D of f is the whole of UN .
Independence (I) Given any non-empty subset A ⊂ X, if the two utility
function profiles uN , u˜N ∈ UN are equal on A, then the associated
social orderings f(uN ), f(u˜N ) ∈ UN are also equal on A.
Pareto indifference (P0) In case y, z ∈ X and uN ∈ UN satisfy uN (y) =
uN (z), the associated social indifference relation satisfies y I(uN ) z.
An important result in social choice theory with interpersonal compar-
isons is the “strong neutrality” or “welfarism” result due to d’Aspremont
and Gevers (1977) and Sen (1977, p. 1553). This states that, when f sat-
isfies all three conditions (U), (I), and (P0), then there exists a (complete
1Most notation and definitions are based on Roberts (1980). Where appropriate, how-
ever, bold letters are used to indicate vectors.
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and transitive) social welfare ordering R∗ on RN with the property that
y R z ⇐⇒ uN (x) R∗ uN (y). This result plays a prominent role among
the results appearing the surveys by Sen (1984), Blackorby, Donaldson and
Weymark (1984), d’Aspremont (1985), Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998),
and Bossert and Weymark (2004). Both Sen (1977) and d’Aspremont (1985,
p. 34) provide complete proofs.2
While the Pareto indifference axiom (P0) is appealing, the impossibility
theorem in Arrow (1963) replaces it with the following alternative:
Pareto (P) In case y, z ∈ X and uN ∈ UN satisfy uN (y)  uN (z), the
associated strict preference relation P (uN ) satisfies y P (uN ) z.3
Specifically, under the assumption that utilities are ordinally non-comparable,
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that (U), (I) and (P) together imply
a dictatorship. To develop a theory general enough to cover this important
case, Roberts (1980, p. 427) specifies the following additional condition:
Weak continuity (WC) For all uN ∈ UN and  ∈ RN with  0, there
exists a uN ∈ UN satisfying  uN (x)− uN  0 for all x ∈ X such
that f(uN ) = f(uN ).
Then (p. 428) he claims the following:
Claim 1. Suppose that f satisfies (U), (I), (P), and (WC). Then there
exists a continuous function RN 3 w 7→W (w)→ R, strictly increasing with
an increase in all its arguments, with the property that for all uN ∈ UN and
all y, z ∈ X one has
W (uN (y)) > W (uN (z)) =⇒ y P (uN ) z
This claim has come to be known as Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak
welfarism” theorem.4 In many of the surveys mentioned above, it was cited
as an alternative to the strong neutrality result of d’Aspremont and Gevers
(1977) and Sen (1977, p. 1553). The unpublished results by Le Breton
2Unfortunately, d’Aspremont’s proof, which is otherwise the more elegant of the two,
includes a crucial typographical error. The option e should be chosen so that b 6= e 6= d.
3Given any pair a,b ∈ RN with a = (ai)i∈N and b = (bi)i∈N , we use the following
notation for vector orderings: (i) a = b in case ai ≥ bi for all i ∈ N ; (ii) a  b in case
ai > bi for all i ∈ N ; (iii) a > b in case a = b but a 6= b.
4The Roberts’ theorem which is the topic of this paper concerns social choice in the
sense of aggregating preferences. It differs from the Roberts’ theorem on revelation of
preferences that appeared in Roberts (1979), and has subsequently been discussed by,
amongst others, Lavi et al. (2009) and Mishra and Sen (2012).
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(1987) and by Bordes and Le Breton (1987) investigating Roberts’ theorem
for restricted economic domains have since been amalgamated with related
results that appear in Bordes, Hammond and Le Breton (2005).
Condition (WC), however, is too weak for the claim to hold. To show
this, Section 2 provides a counter example which even satisfies the following
familiar condition:
Strict Pareto (P∗) In case y, z ∈ X and uN ∈ UN satisfy uN (y) = uN (z),
the associated social preferences satisfy y R(uN ) z, with y P (uN ) z in
case uN (y) > uN (z).
The same example shows the error in Roberts’ attempt to prove his inter-
mediate Lemma 6. Then Section 3 uses a modified form of the alternative
“shift invariance” condition due to Roberts (1983, p. 74) himself in order to
prove the crucial Lemma 6 in Roberts (1980). This establishes that a slight
alteration to Claim 1 makes it valid.
2 Weak Continuity: A Counter Example
The following is an example of a society with two individuals and a strictly
increasing and symmetric utilitarian welfare function
R2 3 (u1, u2) = u 7→W (u1, u2) = W (u)→ R (1)
such that the induced SWFL defined on X by
a R b⇐⇒W (u1(a), u2(a)) ≥W (u1(b), u2(b)) (2)
satisfies conditions (U), (I), (P∗) and (WC). Yet the functionW has a discon-
tinuity at the origin 0 = (0, 0) which gives rise to a discontinuous induced
ordering on R2. This implies that no continuous function W can satisfy
Claim 1 in this example.
Indeed, first define the function R2 3 (v1, v2) 7→ w(v1, v2) ∈ R by
w(v1, v2) := min{v1 + 2v2, 2v1 + v2} (3)
Then define R2 3 (v1, v2) = v 7→W (v1, v2) = W (v) ∈ R by
W (v) :=

1 + w(v) if w(v) > 0;
exp
(v1 + 2v2) (2v1 + v2)
3(v1 + v2)
if w(v) ≤ 0 and v1 + v2 > 0;
v1 + v2 if v1 + v2 ≤ 0.
(4)
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Thus, the composite function W is defined for three different regions of R2
separated by: (i) the indifference curve W (v1, v2) = 0; and (ii) the closure
of the indifference set W (v1, v2) = 1, which is made up of two open half-
lines emanating from the origin (0, 0). Note that (0, 0) is in the closure
of all three regions. The corresponding indifference map is illustrated in
Figure 1. The three-dimensional graph of W (v1, v2) has a boundary that
includes a vertical “cliff” of height 1 at (v1, v2) = (0, 0) where W (0, 0) = 0,
yet every neighbourhood of (0, 0) has points v where w(v) > 0, implying
that W (v) > 1. Everywhere apart from the origin, however, the mapping
v 7→W (v) is continuous, as is easy to check.
Figure 1: Level curves of the social welfare function (v1, v2) 7→W (v1, v2)
Nor can this discontinuity be removed by a strictly increasing transfor-
mation. To see this, consider any point v¯ = (v¯1, v¯2) ∈ R2 satisfying w(v¯) < 0
and v¯1 + v¯2 > 0, implying that 0 < W (v¯) < 1. Now, every neighbourhood
of (0, 0) has points v where w(v) > 0 and so W (v) > 1. So after applying
any strictly increasing transformation R 3 W 7→ W˜ = ψ(W ) ∈ R to the
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function v 7→W (v), one has
W˜ (0) = ψ(0) < W˜ (v¯) = ψ(W (v¯)) < ψ(1) < ψ(W (v)) = W˜ (v)
This shows that the discontinuity at (0, 0) cannot be removed.
Consider now the SWFL U2 3 (u1, u2) 7→ f(u1, u2) defined by (2), (3)
and (4). Obviously, this induced SWFL satisfies conditions (U), (I) and
(P∗). To verify condition (WC) it is enough to construct, for each  =
(1, 2) (0, 0), a transformation
R2 3 v 7→ φ(v) = (φ1(v), φ2(v)) ∈ R2
satisfying
(0, 0) (v1, v2)− φ(v) 
together with the requirement that v 7→ W (φ(v)) and v 7→ W (v) are
ordinally equivalent welfare functions in the sense that there exists a strictly
increasing transformation R 3 w 7→ ψ(w) ∈ R for which W (φ(v)) ≡
ψ(W (v)).
In the following constructions, let
∗ := min{1, 2} ∈ R and e := (1, 1) ∈ R2 (5)
Then ∗ > 0, of course. The transformation will take the form
R2 3 v 7→ φ(v) := v − λ(v) e ∈ R2 (6)
for a suitably constructed scalar function R2 3 v 7→ λ(v) ∈ R taking values
in the open interval (0, ∗).
Case 1: The simplest case is when
v1 + v2 ≤ 0 and so W (v) = v1 + v2 ≤ 0 (7)
In this case, define λ(v) := 12 ∗ for ∗ given by (5). Then it is easy to see
from (5), (6), and (7) that φ1(v) + φ

2(v) = v1 + v2 − ∗ ≤ −∗ < 0. Now,
whenever v1 + v2 ≤ 0, it follows that
W (φ(v)) = φ1(v) + φ

2(v) = ψ
(W (v))
provided we define
ψ(W ) := W − ∗ for all W ≤ 0 (8)
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Case 2: This case occurs when
w(v) > 0 and so W (v) = 1 + w(v) > 1 (9)
In this case, define
λ(v) := 16 min{∗, w(v)} (10)
Clearly, this definition implies that λ(v) ∈ (0, ∗). Also
φ1(v) + 2φ

2(v) = v1 + 2v2 − 3λ(v)
and 2φ1(v) + φ

2(v) = 2v1 + v2 − 3λ(v)
Because w(v) := min{v1 + 2v2, 2v1 + v2} and λ(v) ≤ 16w(v), it follows that
min{φ1(v) + 2φ2(v), 2φ1(v) + φ2(v)} = w(v)− 3λ(v) ≥ 12 w(v) > 0
Then the definitions of R2 3 v 7→W (v) ∈ R and of R2 3 v 7→ λ(v) ∈ R in
(4) and (10) imply that
1 < W (ψ(v)) = 1 + min{ φ1(v) + 2φ2(v), 2φ1(v) + φ2(v)}
= 1 + w(v)− 3λ(v) = 1 + w(v)− 12 min{∗, w(v)}
= max{1 + w(v)− 12∗, 1 + 12w(v)}
= max{W (v)− 12 ∗, 12 [W (v) + 1]}
It follows that W (ψ(v)) = ψ(W (v)) provided that we define
ψ(W ) := max{W − 12 ∗, 12 (W + 1)} for all W > 1 (11)
Case 3: This leaves the hardest third case, when
w(v) ≤ 0 and also v1 + v2 > 0 (12)
In this case, the definition in (4) implies that 0 < W (v) ≤ 1.
Fix any v = (v1, v2) ∈ R2 satisfying (12). Then, given any  ∈ R2
satisfying  0, consider the non-empty open interval of R defined by
I(v) := (0,min{∗, 12(v1 + v2)}) = (0, ∗) ∩ (0, 12(v1 + v2)) (13)
Now consider the function g defined on the open interval in (13) by
I(v) 3 λ 7→ g(λ) := W (v − λ e) ∈ R (14)
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Because definition (3) implies that W is strictly increasing as a function of
two variables, it follows that g is strictly decreasing. Also, when λ > 0, it is
evident that
w(v − λ e) < w(v) ≤ 0 (15)
On the other hand, when λ < 12(v1 + v2), because e1 = e2 = 1, one has
(v1 − λe1) + (v2 − λe2) = v1 + v2 − 2λ > 0 (16)
So for all λ ∈ I(v) the inequalities (15) and (16) imply that the 2-vector
v−λ e satisfies (12). It follows that W (v−λ e) is also defined as in Case 3,
so (4) implies that
g(λ) = W (v − λ e) = exp (v1 + 2v2 − 3λ) (2v1 + v2 − 3λ)
3(v1 + v2 − 2λ) (17)
Now let µ denote a suitably chosen positive scalar constant which is
independent of both v and , and whose possible range will be specified
later. For each v ∈ R2 that satisfies the inequalities (12), because g is
strictly decreasing and positive, we can define λ(v) implicitly as the unique
value of λ that solves the equation
g(λ) = W (v − λ e) = W (v) exp(−µ ∗) (18)
Then λ(v) will be well defined and positive, with
W (φ(v)) = W (v) exp(−µ ∗) = ψ(W (v)) < 1
where ψ(W ) := W exp(−µ ∗) ∈ (0, 1) whenever 0 < W ≤ 1.
It remains only to choose µ > 0 so that the corresponding solution to
equation (18) satisfies λ(v) < ∗. In fact, we find a solution in the open
interval I(v) defined by (13). Because we are assuming that the inequalities
(12) hold, definition (4) implies that any λ(v) satisfying (18) and (13) must
be a value of λ which solves the equation
(v1 + 2v2 − 3λ) (2v1 + v2 − 3λ)
3(v1 + v2 − 2λ) =
(v1 + 2v2) (2v1 + v2)
3(v1 + v2)
− µ ∗
But v1 + v2 > 2λ > 0 in the relevant interval of values of λ, so we can clear
fractions to obtain the quadratic equation q(λ) = 0, where
q(λ) := (v1 + v2) (v1 + 2v2 − 3λ) (2v1 + v2 − 3λ)
− (v1 + v2 − 2λ) (v1 + 2v2) (2v1 + v2)
+ 3µ ∗ (v1 + v2) (v1 + v2 − 2λ) (19)
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Now, note that when λ = 0 the first two terms on the right-hand side of
(19) cancel. Because v1 + v2 > 0, it follows that
q(0) = 3µ ∗ (v1 + v2)2 > 0 (20)
In addition, simple calculation shows that
q
(
1
2(v1 + v2)
)
= −14(v1 + v2) (v1 − v2)2 (21)
Finally, some much more tedious but still routine algebraic manipulation
shows that
q(∗) = (v1 + v2) ∗ [(9− 6µ) ∗ + (3µ− 5) (v1 + v2)] + 2v1v2 ∗ (22)
Because v1 + v2 > 0 but w(v) ≤ 0, it follows from (3) that v1 and v2 have
opposite signs. In particular v1 6= v2 and v1v2 < 0. Then (21) implies that
q(12(v1 +v2)) < 0 whereas (22) implies that for any µ satisfying 9 < 6µ < 10
one has q(∗) < 0. So choosing any fixed µ ∈
(
3
2 ,
5
3
)
guarantees that, by the
intermediate value theorem, the quadratic equation q(λ) = 0 has one real
root λ(v) in the open interval I(v) = (0,min{ ∗, 12(v1 + v2) } defined by
(13).5 In particular, for each v satisfying (12), the root λ(v) of q(λ) = 0
that we have found lies in (0, ∗), as required.
Finally, putting all three cases together gives W (φ(v)) ≡ ψ(W (v)),
where φ(v) = v − λ(v) e, and then
ψ(W ) :=

W − 12 (1 + 2) if W ≤ 0;
W exp(−µ ∗) if 0 < W ≤ 1;
max{W − 12 ∗, 12 (W + 1) } if W > 1.
In particular, ψ is strictly increasing in W for each fixed  0.
Next, to see where his proof erred, we adapt some more notation from
Roberts (1980, pp. 425–6). The relation  on utility vectors in RN is defined
so that a  b iff there exist a utility function profile uN ∈ U and two social
states x, y ∈ X with x f(u) y such that a  u(x) and u(y)  b. Then,
for each v∗ ∈ RN , the three sets L(v∗), M(v∗) and N(v∗) are defined
respectively by
L(v∗) := {v ∈ RN | v∗  v} (23)
M(v∗) := {v ∈ RN | v  v∗} (24)
N(v∗) := RN \ [L(v∗) ∪M(v∗)] (25)
5Because q(λ) → +∞ as λ → +∞, the quadratic equation q(λ) = 0 has a second
irrelevant real root that satisfies λ > max{ ∗, 12 (v1 + v2) }.
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Now, in the above example the set N(0) is equal to the middle region where
W (v) ∈ [0, 1]. Note too that, although v ∈ N(0) whenever W (v) ∈ (0, 1],
one will have v− η  −η′ whenever η,η′  0 with η small enough so that
W (v) ≥ 0 because η1 + η2 ≤ v1 + v2. This contradicts Roberts’ claim, in
the course of trying to prove Lemma 6, that: “. . . as v + γ ∈ N(v∗), (WC)
ensures that v + γ − η3 ∈ N(v∗ − η4) for some   η3,η4  0 where  is
subject to choice.”
3 A New Sufficient Condition
Roberts (1983, p. 74) later introduced a shift invariance condition which
can be slightly restated as follows:
Condition (SI) For all profiles uN ∈ UN and all  ∈ RN with   0,
there exists an ′ ∈ RN with ′  0 and a profile u˜N ∈ UN such that
f(uN ) = f(u˜N ) and, for all x ∈ X, one has  uN (x)− u˜N (x) ′.
As he states in a footnote: “Shift invariance is slightly stronger than
. . . (WC). . . . The strengthening allows one to deal with problems that are
akin to the existence of poles in a consumer’s indifference map . . . .”6 How-
ever, when proving his Lemma A.5, it seems that Roberts (1983, p. 90) in
the end reverses the order of some quantifiers and actually uses the following
uniform shift invariance assumption:
Condition (USI) For all  ∈ RN with   0, there exists an ′ ∈ RN
with ′  0 for which, given any profile uN ∈ UN , there exists a
profile u˜N ∈ UN such that f(uN ) = f(u˜N ) and, for all x ∈ X, one has
 uN (x)− u˜N (x) ′.
Instead of (WC) or (SI), I shall use the following pairwise continuity
assumption which weakens (USI):
Condition (PC) For all  ∈ RN with   0, there exists an ′ ∈ RN
with ′  0 for which, given any profile uN ∈ UN and any pair
x, y ∈ X for which x P (uN ) y, there exists a profile u˜N ∈ UN with
u˜N (x) uN (x)− ′ and u˜N (y) uN (y)−  such that x P (u˜N ) y.
6Indeed, it is this footnote that suggested to me how the above counter example might
be constructed.
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Like shift invariance, this condition strengthens weak continuity because
the same strictly positive vector ′ must work simultaneously for all x, y ∈ X.
Like uniform shift invariance, it also strengthens shift invariance because the
same strictly positive vector ′ must also work for all profiles uN ∈ UN . On
the other hand, condition (PC) weakens even condition (WC) to the extent
that the profile u˜N can depend on the pair x, y ∈ X, and also only one-way
strict inequalities need be satisfied.
Of course, just as with Roberts’ (WC) and (SI) conditions, condition
(USI) and so (PC) is certainly satisfied if f is invariant under the set of
all shift transformations of individual utility functions that take the form
u˜i(x) ≡ α + ui(x) (for all i ∈ N and x ∈ X) with α ∈ R independent
of i. This is true, for example, if individual utilities satisfy cardinal full
comparability with invariant units. However, none of the four conditions
(WC), (SI), (USI) and (PC) need be satisfied if each utility function can
have both positive and negative values and if f is invariant only under the
set of all transformations that take the form u˜i(x) ≡ βi ui(x) (for all i ∈ N
and x ∈ X) with each individual’s βi > 0. This explains why Blackorby
and Donaldson (1982) and also Tsui and Weymark (1997) imposed other
continuity conditions in considering ratio-scale invariant social welfare func-
tionals.7 With condition (PC) replacing (WC), Roberts’ Lemma 6 will be
proved via the following two separate lemmas that involve definitions (24)
and (25):
Lemma 1. If f satisfies (U), (I) and (P), then for all v,v′,η,η′ ∈ RN with
η,η′  0, one has v ∈ N(v′) =⇒ v + η ∈M(v′ − η′).8
Proof. Suppose that x, y, z are three distinct elements of X. By condition
(U), there exists a profile uN ∈ UN such that
v + η  uN (x) uN (y) v and v′  uN (z) v′ − η′ (26)
Now z P (uN ) y would imply that v′  v. So v ∈ N(v′) =⇒ y R(uN ) z.
Then the Pareto condition (P) implies that x P (uN ) y, and so v ∈ N(v′) =⇒
x P (uN ) z because R(uN ) is transitive. From (26) it follows that v ∈
N(v′) =⇒ v + η  v′ − η′.
7I owe this to John Weymark, as well as the observation that the remark following
Roberts’ Lemma 8 is also incorrect. Note, however, that if we limit the domain of utility
profiles uN to those that have strictly positive (resp. negative) values throughout X, then
one can work instead with lnui(x) (resp. − ln[−ui(x)]) as a transformed utility function.
8This is the correct “preliminary result” in Roberts’ discussion of Lemma 6. However,
the proof provided seemed incomplete.
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Part (b) of the following Lemma is a minor restatement of the conclusion
of Lemma 6 in Roberts (1983):
Lemma 2. If f satisfies (U), (I), (P) and (PC), then:
(a) if ,v,v′ in RN satisfy   0 as well as v + η ∈ M(v′ + ) for all
η  0, then v ∈M(v′);
(b) for all v,v′ in RN that satisfy v ∈ N(v∗), there is no γ ∈ RN with
γ  0 such that v + γ ∈ N(v∗).
Proof. (a) Given   0, let ′  0 be specified as in the statement of
condition (PC). Choose η  0 so that η  ′. Because v + η ∈M(v′ + ),
there exist uN ∈ UN and x, y ∈ X such that x P (uN ) y while
v + η  uN (x) and uN (y) v′ + 
By condition (PC), there exists u˜N ∈ UN such that x P (u˜N ) y while
u˜N (x) uN (x)− ′ and u˜N (y) uN (y)− 
But then
u˜N (x) v + η − ′  v and u˜N (y) v′
It follows that v  v′.
(b) Suppose that v + γ ∈ N(v∗). By definition (25), it follows that
v∗ ∈ N(v + γ). Choose any γ ′  0 satisfying γ ′  γ. Now Lemma 1
implies that v∗ + η ∈ M(v + γ ′) for all η  0. So part (a) implies that
v∗ ∈M(v). In particular, v 6∈ N(v∗).
4 Conclusion
The weak neutrality or welfarism theorem due to Roberts (1980) is indeed
“both important and useful” (p. 428). The minor errors in its statement and
in the proof of the key Lemma 6 are not very difficult to correct by replac-
ing the weak continuity condition (WC) with the new pairwise continuity
condition (PC) stated here in Section 3.
An open question is whether the closely related Theorem 1 of Roberts
(1983) holds under shift invariance (SI) instead of uniform shift invariance
(USI), which is stronger than (PC). However, even (USI) is weak enough
that having to impose it instead of (WC) or (SI) would do little to detract
from the significance or wide applicability of Roberts’ theorem.
11
Only in the case of ratio-scale measurability of utilities that can change
sign does Roberts’ theorem seem inapplicable. This happens to be exactly
the setting that we considered in Chichilnisky et al. (2020). But there we
use an original position or “impartial benefactor” argument to derive a util-
itarian SWFL more directly.
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